Trust, power (a)symmetry and misrepresentation in negotiation.

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Trust, power and deception

Using a simulated, two-party negotiation, we examined how trustworthiness and power balance affected deception. To trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties. We found that deception was lower when the other party was perceived as reliable, predictable or as having shared goals. Deception increased when the other party was perceived as benevolent. Power balance did not affect the use of deception. However, in power asymmetric dyads high trust (predictability, benevolence) decreased the use of deception whereas the same attributes triggered increases in the use of deception when power was symmetrically distributed. High predictability increased passive deception in symmetric, low power dyads whereas high benevolence increased active deception in symmetric, high power dyads. These findings are consistent with the view that low power is associated with inhibition and high power is associated with activation.
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Trust, power (a)symmetry and misrepresentation in negotiation.

Social exchange characterizes many aspects of our day-to-day relationships, including negotiation. It is defined as “a reciprocal act of benefit” (Molm, Takahashi & Peterson, 2000, p. 1396) in which one party offers a valued resource to the other, with the expectation but no guarantee that this act will be reciprocated. As a result, social exchanges generate risk, uncertainty and the possibility of exploitation (Kollock, 1994; Molm et al., 2000). In negotiation, as in other social exchanges, we can never fully know the goals and intentions of the other party or the extent to which they have exchanged goods of comparable value (Kollock, 1994). This opens the possibility that exchanges will be asymmetrical, that is, that one party will exploit the other for personal gain.

Under what conditions will individuals act exploitatively? It is likely that our decisions about whether to make a fair trade will be based on our assessment of the other person’s intentions. We are more likely to act fairly, to the extent that we believe the other person is well-intentioned and unlikely to exploit us. We are likely to act in a self-protective way when we have concerns about the other party’s motives (Dees & Cramton, 1991). Consequently, one of our goals in social exchanges is to reduce uncertainty by determining the other party’s goals and likely behaviors. We infer others’ intentions from a range of sources, including their personal attributes and characteristics of the underlying relationship (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994).

In this research, we examine how the personal attribute of trustworthiness and one feature of the negotiating relationship, power balance, affect negotiators’ decisions to
reveal accurate information to the other party. We focus on information accuracy because information is a key resource for negotiators, who face competing incentives to reveal and conceal information (Murnighan et al., 1999). On the one hand, exchanging accurate information helps negotiators to maximize joint outcomes by identifying the needs of both parties. On the other hand, providing accurate information creates the possibility that this information will be used in an exploitative way to benefit the other party. Withholding or misrepresenting information offers the dual benefits of protecting individuals from possible exploitation and increasing a negotiator’s own power. Consequently, negotiators can gain an advantage by limiting the amount and accuracy of the information that they give to the other party (Aquino, 1998; Lewicki, 1982; Murnighan et al., 1999). We investigate how trust and power balance shape negotiators’ decisions to deceive the other party by withholding or misrepresenting information.

**Trust and Deception**

Trust stems from our positive expectations about another individual’s intentions towards us (Boon & Holmes, 1991; Lewicki & Bunker, 1994) and can be defined as “an individual’s beliefs in, and the willingness to act on behalf of, the words, actions and decisions of another” (McAllister, 1995, p25). The development of trust is based on our interpretation of another person’s behaviors, specifically the extent to which they appear benign (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). There are several cues that we can use to assess the trustworthiness of the other party, including our perceptions of their reliability, predictability, benevolence and the extent to which we have shared goals (Battacharya, Devinney & Pillutla, 1998; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Mayer, Schoorman & Babakus, 1995; Sheppard & Sherman, 1998). These cues build trust rapidly because they influence
Trust plays a central role in shaping behavior whenever individuals encounter risk and uncertainty, as is the case in social exchange relationships (Battacharya et al., 1998; Sheppard & Sherman, 1998; Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998). It does this by reducing uncertainty about the likely future behavior of the other party, specifically by reducing concerns that the other party will behave exploitatively (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Kim, Pinkley & Fragale, 2005). Each of the cues that we identified above can increase trust because it increases our ability to accurately assess the other party’s likely actions (Battacharya et al., 1998). This implies that when we perceive others as trustworthy, that is as having benign intentions, our risk is reduced. High trust should increase our willingness to enter into fair trades and, in the context of negotiation, to offer the other party accurate information about preferences. Consistent with this argument, Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) demonstrated that perceived trustworthiness increases the exchange of resources, including information. Conversely, low trust should increase our concerns about how the other party will use such information and elicit self-protective action, that is, the concealment or misrepresentation of our preferences.

**H1.** Low trust in the other party will result in higher levels of deception.

**Power Asymmetry and Deception**

Power can be viewed as an attribute of the individual, that is, an individual’s ability to withhold valued resources or administer punishments (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; De Dreu, 1995). Consistent with a social exchange perspective, we are more interested in a *relational* view of power, which emphasizes the
relative dependence of each party on the other. Emerson (1962), for example, argues that power cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be understood relative to the power of both parties in an exchange relationship (Blau, 1964; Somech & Drach Zahary, 2002; Wolfe & McGinn, 2005). Importantly, this relational view draws attention to the balance of power within a relationship, that is, whether it is symmetrically or asymmetrically distributed. It also raises the question of when power is most salient and consequently most likely to trigger deceptive action. In developing our hypotheses, we consider two competing models of the relationship between power asymmetry and deception in negotiation.

**Power asymmetry.** One interpretation of a relational perspective is that power will be most salient when it is asymmetrically distributed, that is when negotiators have different levels of power. Research shows that under conditions of power asymmetry, high power negotiators are more likely to engage in put downs and threats and to ask fewer diagnostic questions (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2003; Giebels, De Dreu & Van de Vliert, 1998, 2000; Rubin & Brown, 1975). However, low power negotiators do not necessarily respond submissively (Rubin & Zartman, 1999, 2000), suggesting that power asymmetry triggers a power struggle in which low power negotiators take action to reduce the power gap (Kim et al., 2005). Consistent with this, recent findings suggest that low power individuals are most likely to take action when they feel threatened (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). To the extent that low power negotiators act to reduce the power gap, we expect that high power negotiators will react by attempting to maintain the gap. This implies that, as negotiators struggle to redress the power imbalance, they will decrease the amount and accuracy of the information that they give to the other party.
H2a. Deception will be higher when power is asymmetrically distributed than when it is symmetrically distributed.

Power symmetry. An alternative possibility is that, within power asymmetric dyads, relationships are well-defined and stable (e.g., Tenbrunsel & Messick, 200?). Negotiators recognize the power discrepancy and work within the constraints of this power imbalance. For example, research shows that negotiators exchange more accurate information when power is asymmetrically distributed (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 200?). This implies that power struggles will emerge when power is symmetrically distributed rather than when it is asymmetrically distributed. Under conditions of symmetrical power, negotiators must take action in order to gain an advantage over the other party. It is, however, unclear whether that action is most likely to occur when both parties have high power or when both parties have low power. On the one hand, research showing that powerful individuals are more likely to take action (Anderson & Berdhal, 2002; Galinsky, Gruenfeld & Magee, 2003; Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003) suggests that such action is mostly likely to occur in symmetric high power relationships. On the other hand, recent theorizing suggests it is more likely to occur in symmetric low power relationships (Kim et al., 2005). Consequently, we hypothesize that

H2b. Deception will be higher when power symmetrically distributed than when it is asymmetrically distributed.

Trust-Power Interactions

It is plausible that the effects of power distribution will be moderated by negotiators’ perceptions of the other party. Evidence for such a person-situation interaction is provided by Chen, Lee-Chai and Bargh (2001), who demonstrated that a
communal orientation limits the use of power whereas an exchange orientation does not (also, Deutsch, 1982). Similarly, the more contentious behaviors of high power negotiators are apparent only when both parties have competitive goals but not when they have cooperative goals (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2003; Giebels et al., 2000). Finally, in reconciling the conflicting evidence about the relationship between power and the accuracy of social information processing, Overbeck and Park (2001) argue that contextual factors affect whether high power individuals are more or less likely stereotype others.

These findings suggest that the relationships we described in Hypotheses 2a and 2b may be moderated by our perceptions of the other party’s intentions towards us, specifically the extent to which they signal their intention to act benevolently. One marker of benevolence is the extent to which individuals are seen as trustworthy. Consistent with this argument, research shows that power increases the salience of trust in negotiation (De Dreu, Giebels & Van de Vliert, 1998). As we argued in the preceding section, trustworthiness can reduce the level of risk that negotiators exposed to and limit their need to take self-protective action. Consequently, we predict that perceived trustworthiness will interact with power to shape negotiators’ decisions to deceive the other party. Combining our arguments leads to the following, competing hypotheses:

\[ H3a: \text{Deception will lowest when power is asymmetric and trust is high} \]

\[ H3b: \text{Deception will be lowest when power is symmetric and trust is high.} \]
METHOD

Participants

One hundred and twenty undergraduate students at a large metropolitan university participated in a simulated employment contract negotiation. Of these, 29 participants were male and 91 were female, with an average age of 19.1 years.

Procedure

Participants negotiated a simulated employment contract. Written instructions assigned participants to the role of either an employer or an employee, described the task, and gave a payoff schedule that described the points awarded for each possible contract. Table 1 shows the information given to participants. As can be seen in Table 1, negotiators were required to reach agreement on eight issues. Each negotiator had one indifference issue, that is, one issue that was worth no points. Past research has shown that such issues trigger deception (Carnevale et al., 2001). For recruiters, it was job assignment; for applicants, it was start date.

| Insert Table 1 about here |

Power. Embedded in the instructions was a power manipulation. Negotiators were given information about the availability of alternative employees (if they were the employer) or alternative employers (if they were the employee). In the high power condition, negotiators were told that they had several alternative, desirable candidates/employers with whom they could negotiate. Conversely, in the low power condition, negotiators were told that they had no alternative, desirable
candidates/employers with whom they could negotiate. To reinforce these instructions, we asked negotiators in the high power condition to write a short essay describing a situation in which they had felt powerful; we asked negotiators in the low power condition to write a short essay describing a situation in which they had felt powerless (Galinsky et al., 2003). Each negotiation was conducted face-to-face and was videotaped for subsequent transcribing.

**Trust.** Participants completed a modified version of Lewicki, Stevenson and Bunker’s Trust Scale (1997), which measures reliability (calculus-based trust, \( \alpha = 0.81 \)), consistency (knowledge-based trust, \( \alpha = 0.64 \)) and shared goals (identity-based trust, \( \alpha = 0.72 \)). Reliability is measured by items such as “This person’s behavior will meet my expectations”; predictability is measured by items such as “I think I pretty well know what this person’s reactions are going to be;’ and, the perception that we have shared goals is measured by items such as “This person and I stand for the same basic things”. We computed scores for each type of trust by averaging across questions. This scale uses a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. Benevolence was measured by a set of five, bi-polar adjectives: bad (1) – good (7), unhelpful- helpful, not well-intentioned- well-intentioned, insincere-sincere (\( \alpha = 0.86 \)). High scores indicate high reliability, predictability, benevolence and shared goals. Table 2 shows inter-correlations between these variables and scale reliabilities.

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*Insert Table 2 about here*
**Deception.** After transcribing negotiations, we identified every occasion on which negotiators mentioned the two indifference issues. Drawing on past research, we distinguished between active and passive forms of deception. Deception can be active, as is the case when individuals misrepresent the situation by giving false information, or passive, as is the case when individuals conceal information (Bok, 1978; Ekman, 2001). These two forms of deception are frequently referred to as *sins of commission* and *sins of omission*, respectively (O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997; Schweitzer & Croson, 1999; Spranca, Minsk & Baron, 1991).

Two coders, blind to the study’s hypotheses, coded statements about the indifference issue as being honesty, a sin of omission, a sin of commission, or “other”. Applying O’Connor and Carnevale’s definition, we coded any use of the indifference issue in a trade-off as a sin of omission (leveraging). Inter-rater reliability, as measured by Cohen’s $\kappa$, was 0.87. Not all forms of deception occurred on all dyads. Mean use of each tactic in each dyad was honesty (0.52), sins of commission (0.43), and sins of omission (2.13).

**Approach to data analysis**

We used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to test our hypotheses. The use of HLM offers the advantage of enabling us to examine individual behaviors while controlling for dyadic membership (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Kenny, Kashy & Bolger, 1998). Our model allowed for a random intercept, but fixed all other slopes. Although we had no hypotheses about Role we included this as a control variable. Because of the relatively low frequency with which deception occurred, we modeled our dependent variables using a Poisson distribution.
Before testing our hypotheses, we tested the null model for each of our independent variables (leveraging, sins of commission and honesty) by modeling the intercept with equations that had no Level 1 or Level 2 predictors in the model. The purpose of doing this is to demonstrate that there are significant between-group differences in our independent variables. For each variable, we found this to be the case: leveraging, $\gamma_{00}=0.76$, $t(59)=7.88$, $p<.001$; sins of commission, $\gamma_{00}=-0.81$, $t(59)=-5.58$, $p<.001$; and, honesty, $\gamma_{00}=-0.64$, $t(59)=-5.01$, $p<.001$.

We fit three models, one for each kind of deception and for honesty. In 2-level models, Level 1 predictor variables describe attributes of the individual and Level 2 predictor variables describe attributes of the dyad. Our Level 1 predictor variables were role, reliability, consistency, benevolence and empathy. The number of high power negotiators in the dyad (0,1 or 2) was entered as the Level 2 predictor variable. In setting up the model, we specified interactions between our Level 2 variable (power balance) and the Level 1 intercept, as well as between our Level 2 variable and trustworthiness cues. Support for Hypothesis 1 would be provided by the finding that Level 1 variables (trustworthiness cues) predicted deception. Hypothesis 2 would be supported by a finding that our Level 2 variable, power balance, predicted deception. Significant cross-level interactions between trustworthiness cues (Level 1) and power balance (Level 2) would support Hypothesis 3.

RESULTS

Consistent with Hypothesis 1, leveraging was used more frequently when the other party was perceived as unreliable, $\gamma_{30}=-0.54$, $t(108)=-3.86$, $p<.001$, and unpredictable, $\gamma_{50}=-0.62$, $t(108)=-3.17$, $p<.005$. We found no support for Hypotheses
2a or 2b, which predicted that asymmetric and symmetric power would differentially affect the use of deception. We did, however, find a person-situation interaction (H3), in that perceived predictability interacted with power (a)symmetry to affect the use of leveraging, $\gamma_{51}=0.29$, $t(108)=2.67$, $p<.01$. To interpret this interaction, we split the sample into thirds, based on their ratings of the other party’s predictability. We classified scores falling into the top third of the distribution as “high” and those falling into the bottom third of the distribution as “low”. Figure 1 shows the relationships between high/low predictability, power symmetry and leveraging. As can be seen in this figure, negotiators in power asymmetric dyads reduced their use of leveraging when the other party was perceived as predictable (H3a). However, negotiators in symmetric, low power dyads increased their use of leveraging in response to the other party’s trustworthiness.

Consistent with H1, negotiators were less likely to engage in sins of commission when the other party was perceived as reliable, $\gamma_{30}=-1.39$, $t(108)=-3.99$, $p<.001$, or as having shared goals, $\gamma_{60}=-0.63$, $t(108)=-2.96$, $p=.005$. Contrary to H1, we found that benevolence predicted an increase in sins of commission, $\gamma_{20}=0.67$, $t(108)=2.43$, $p<.05$. Benevolence also interacted with power (a)symmetry to affect the use of sins of commission, $\gamma_{21}=-0.54$, $t(108)=-2.48$, $p<.05$. To interpret this interaction, we followed the procedure described above. As can be seen in Figure 2, perceived benevolence decreases the use of sins of commission in power asymmetric dyads (H3a) but increases the use of this strategy symmetric, high power dyads.

Decisions about honesty also varied as a function of power (a)symmetry and the perception that negotiators had shared goals, $\gamma_{41}=0.84$, $t(108)=3.76$, $p<.001$. We again followed the procedure described above to interpret this interaction. As can be seen in
Figure 3, perceived trustworthiness (shared goals) substantially increased honesty in symmetric, high power dyads.

**Discussion**

Social exchanges are inherently risky. Individuals initiating an exchange relationship are uncertain about whether the other party will participate in the exchange or will choose to accept a resource without reciprocating. We argued that, for negotiators, information is a highly valuable (and tradable) resource. Decisions to trade information can be costly, if the other party uses the information in a self-serving way. Consequently, negotiators may be tempted to either conceal or misrepresent information, in order to protect themselves. Our research investigated how two factors, trust and power asymmetry, influenced negotiators’ decisions to deceive the other party. We found that trust played an important role in reducing deception (H1) and increasing honesty. Trust also moderated the effects of power asymmetry (H3), so that decisions to deceive were determined by a combination of power balance and perceived trustworthiness.

Negotiators who were perceived as reliable, predictable and as having shared goals triggered less deception by the other party. However, different trustworthiness cues predicted different forms of deception: Whereas unpredictability triggered sins of omission, the absence of shared goals triggered since of commission. These relationships suggest that different kinds of trustworthiness cues imply different kinds of relationship risks, and this in turn triggers specific actions to address those risks (Sheppard and Sherman, 1998).
Decisions to use sins of commission are more complex than decisions to use sins of omission. First, it appears that negotiators adopt a building-block approach and need to accumulate more evidence about trustworthiness before deciding to engage in sins of commission. Our analyses show that whereas sins of omission were predicted by the lack of reliability and predictability, both cues for cognitive trust, decisions about sins of commission were predicted by the lack of cognitive (reliability) and affective (shared goals) trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; McAllister, 1995). However, our data also suggest that negotiators experience mixed motives in their decisions to misrepresent their indifference issues: Whereas cues to reliability and shared goals decreased misrepresentation, cues to benevolence increase misrepresentation. One interpretation of the relationship between benevolence and misrepresentation is that when the other party is perceived as benevolent, negotiators conclude that the costs of betraying trust will be low should their deception be detected. Consequently, their behavior reflects a decision to engage in opportunistic betrayal (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998).

The effects of power were context sensitive. Our results suggest that, in power asymmetric dyads, trust matters on predictable ways. The perception that the other party was predictable or benevolent reduced the use of sins of omission and commission, respectively, in power asymmetric dyads. Clearly, in these dyads, cues to predictability and benevolence provided the necessary assurance that parties would behave responsibly and offset the need for a power struggle. We observed the opposite pattern in power symmetric dyads, where cues to predictability increased sins of omission (low power dyads) and cues to benevolence increased sins of commission (high power dyads). An interesting feature of this pattern is that it is consistent with theorizing that links low
power to inhibition tendencies and high power to approach tendencies (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002).

Taken jointly, these findings suggest that the perceived trustworthiness of the other party cues different mental models in negotiators, depending on whether power is asymmetrically or symmetrically distributed. We believe that this reflects different underlying risks to the negotiation relationship. In the case of power asymmetric dyads, negotiators are concerned about exploitation. Cues to trustworthiness reduce the perceived risk of exploitation and trigger a *fair trade* model (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994), with a resultant drop in deception. However, negotiators in power symmetric dyads behave more like individuals engaged in a power struggle. Negotiators seeking to gain more power may legitimately question the consequences of detection. As we argued earlier, cues to trustworthiness under these conditions provided information about the cost of discovery and trigger an *opportunistic betrayal* model.

To integrate these findings, we consider how different representations of the underlying relationship might increase sensitivity to different kinds of relational risks. We focus on the role of predictability and the perception of shared goals in predicting sins of omission and commission, respectively. Both sets of cues are focused on likely future behaviors. However, whereas predictability is linked to shallow relationships, shared goals are linked to deep relationships (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998). We propose that, in shallow relationships, negotiators take immediate, self-protective action to tip the exchange scales in their favor by including issues of no value in their trades. In deep relationships, negotiators encounter more long-term, normative concerns. In these kinds of relationships, the costs of betrayal (exploitation) are considerably greater than in
shallow relationships (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996) and so trigger more direct, self-protective action such as misrepresenting the value of the indifference issue.

These findings are also interesting when viewed in the context of Kim et al.’s (2005) analysis of power dynamics in negotiation. Their analysis differentiates power-change and power-use tactics; and further distinguishes between conciliatory and hostile power-use tactics. We consider sins of omission - because they are less confronting than sins of commission - to fall within the subset of conciliatory power-use tactics, whereas sins of commission to fall within the subset of hostile power-use tactics. Our results suggest that how negotiators characterize the underlying relationship, in particular their perception of relational depth, affects their choice between conciliatory and hostile power-use tactics.

Honesty, which exposes negotiators to the greatest level of risk, also requires different kinds of assurances about the other party. We found that, when at least one person had high power, honesty increased when negotiators thought the party shared their goals and values. The increase was most noticeable when both parties had high power. This perception enables negotiators to anticipate future action, in a particular provides an assurance that the other party will use power responsibly (e.g., Deutsch, 1982) by not exploiting accurate information. It is a characteristic of deep, interdependent relationships in which the greatest risk is the failure to understand and act in accordance with the needs and values of the other party.

*Implications for Theory and Practice*

Our findings have several implications for managing information exchange in negotiation. Negotiators can inhibit both sins of omission and commission by cuing
reliability. They can further decrease sins of omission by behaving predictably and sins of commission by establishing that they share the other negotiators’ goals and values. However, there is a danger in appearing “nice”, since this elicits misrepresentation. Rather than increasing general liking, negotiators should focus on specific cues to behavior and shared values. Negotiators also need to be aware that while trustworthiness can inhibit inaccurate information, it does not necessarily elicit honest information.

Decisions about honesty, sins of omission and sins of commission were context sensitive. We showed that how perceived trustworthiness impacts decisions to deceive was affected by both the level and distribution of power. In planning their strategies, negotiators need to recognize that whereas trustworthiness decreases deception in power asymmetric dyads, it increases deception in power symmetric dyads. Moreover, the level of power determines whether negotiators engage in passive or active misrepresentation.

The partial mapping between decisions to deceive, relational forms and power dynamics that we have described extends theory and open several avenues for further research. First, we argued that relational depth affects the kinds of deceptive tactics that negotiators use, and also whether the use of these tactics is context sensitive. A more direct test, through manipulating relational forms, would provide support for this argument. Second we have attempted to link the use of deceptive tactics to Kim et al.’s (2005) description of power-use and power-change tactics. Our focus was on power-use tactics and we believe that expanding our research to consider power-change tactics would provide further insight how trust affects decisions to deceive. More broadly, our arguments suggest that research linking relational forms to choices among power-use and
power-change tactics would increase our understanding of the underlying factors that shape negotiators’ tactical choices.

Limitations and Conclusion

Turning to limitations, we restricted our examination of deception by focusing only negotiators’ behavior in relation to the indifference issue. Because participants in simulations need to engage in some level of fabrication in order to sustain the role play, this focus provided a clear measure of deception. However, this approach limits our conclusions to negotiators’ decisions to deceive when confronted with issues that have no value to them. We primed power by asking participants to recall occasions in which they had felt either powerful or powerless. While this has been established as an effective manipulation of power, it does not capture or manipulate the sources of power more typically associated with negotiation, such as availability of alternatives. Our findings speak to how a general feeling of power affects negotiators’ decisions to deceive, but do not elucidate how external factors that impact on power shape those decisions.

In conclusion, we have demonstrated that the perceived trustworthiness of the other party is critical to decisions to deceive. We also demonstrated that trustworthiness cues different models of deceptive behavior, depending on whether it is symmetrically or asymmetrically distributed. When power is symmetrically distributed, trustworthiness cues opportunistic betrayal, whereas when it is asymmetrically distributed it cues fair trade. Placing these findings in broader theoretical frameworks, we proposed that choices between conciliatory and hostile power-use tactics are affected by different representations of the negotiating relationship, in particular whether negotiators perceived the relationship as shallow or deep.

REFERENCES


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Table 2

Correlations between predictor variables.

Alphas shown on diagonal.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>reliability</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>predictability</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>benevolence</td>
<td><strong>0.44</strong></td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>empathy</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td><strong>0.38</strong></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p < .001
Table 3

Summary of significant effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Honesty</th>
<th>Commission</th>
<th>Omission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trust</strong> (H1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>reliability (-)</td>
<td>reliability (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>shared goals(-)</td>
<td>predictability (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>benevolence (+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power Symmetry</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(H2a, H2b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power Symmetry X Trust</strong> (H3a, 3b)</td>
<td>shared goals * symmetry</td>
<td>benevolence * symmetry</td>
<td>predictability * symmetry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. Sins of omission: Interaction of predictability and power symmetry
Figure 2. Sins of commission: Interaction of benevolence and power symmetry
Figure 3. Honesty: Interaction of empathy and power symmetry